Co-authored by Viktoria Lovei.
A federal judge in Chicago recently refused to issue an injunction based upon either the “inevitable disclosure” of trade secrets doctrine or a geographically broad, 24-month non-compete that did not have a narrowly drawn activity restriction. Triumph Packaging Group v. Ward, et al., No. 11-cv-7927 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 2, 2011).
The case was brought by Triumph, a manufacturer of packaging for consumer goods suppliers. It sought, among other things, to enjoin Ward, its former Chief Operating Officer, from assuming a position with AGI, a manufacturer of packaging primarily for the media and entertainment industries.
Triumph argued, among other things, that Ward’s employment with AGI would require him to inevitably use or disclose Triumph’s trade secrets. In evaluating Triumph's claim under the Illinois Trade Secrets Act (“ITSA”), the Court found that Triumph was reasonably likely to succeed in proving the existence of certain trade secrets. However, the Court concluded that Triumph was unlikely to succeed in establishing that the disclosure of such trade secrets by Ward was inevitable because the evidence demonstrated that Ward's role at AGI presented no reasonable danger of him using or disclosing Triumph's trade secrets. Specifically, the Court relied on its findings that: (1) Triumph and AGI were neither “fierce” nor “even direct” competitors because they focused on the manufacture of different types of packaging for mostly different industries and do not currently share any customers; (2) Ward's position at AGI was dissimilar from his position at Triumph in “a variety of ways”; (3) “there is no evidence in the record that Mr. Ward’s new position will require him to use or disclose Triumph’s trade secrets, and he testified credibly that he will not do so”; and (4) Triumph’s trade secrets were not applicable to AGI’s business.
With respect to Ward’s post-employment non-compete, the Court held that it was “extremely overbroad and likely unenforceable.” First, the Court held that it was “extremely broad in geographical scope” because it prohibited Ward “from working with any competitor ‘within any geographical area’ of where Triumph or its subsidiaries engage in business or have plans to engage in business.” Additionally, the Court noted that “the qualifying term ‘within any geographical area’ is unclear and does not provide any degree of certainty as to where Mr. Ward may work without violating the provision.” Second, the Court held that the “duration of the non-compete clause -- 24 months by default and 30 months if Mr. Ward breaches his obligations under the agreement during the prior 24 months – is very lengthy.” The Court agreed with Ward that where “temporal and geographic restrictions on an employee’s conduct are broad . . . the agreement’s activity restrictions should be correspondingly narrowly drawn to protect the employee’s ability to be employed in his chosen field.”
Because the Court found that the non-compete was “significantly overbroad in several ways,” it refused to modify or “blue-pencil” it.
Though not a path breaking decision, this case is nevertheless a reminder about the narrowness of the inevitable disclosure doctrine and the need to draft non-compete clauses as tightly as possible to address a company’s legitimate needs.
- Member of the Firm