On August 10, 2018, the Governor of Massachusetts signed “An Act relative to the judicial enforcement of noncompetition agreements,” otherwise known as The Massachusetts Noncompetition Agreement Act, §24L of Chapter 149 of the Massachusetts General Laws. (That bill was part of a large budget bill, H. 4868, available here; the text of the provisions relevant here at pages 56-62 of the bill as linked). The Act limited non-competition provisions in most employment contexts to one-year and required employers wishing to enforce such a one-year period to pay their ex-employees for the time that such employees are sidelined. The Act also precluded enforcing such provisions against employees laid-off or terminated without cause or against employees classified as non-exempt under the Fair Labor Standards Act. These and the other requirements noted below become effective and apply to employee noncompetition agreements entered into on or after October 1, 2018, and the Act curiously contains some significant exceptions as well. Below we will highlight material aspects of the new law, which was recently featured on Employment Law This Week.

Requirements for Enforcement Start Early

In connection with a non-compete agreement provided to an employee at the start of employment, an employer must provide it to the employee at the time of the offer of employment or ten business days prior to starting employment, whichever is earlier. Act, lines 1282-1291, at page 58-59. (The Act defines such agreements as “an agreement between an employer and employee, or otherwise arising out of an existing or anticipated employment relationship, under which the employee or expected employee agrees that he or she will not engage in certain specified activities competitive with his or her employer after the employment relationship has ended.” Act, lines 1264-1267, at page 57-58)

For a non-competition agreement presented to an employee during employment, the employer must provide it to the employee ten business days before it takes effect and such an agreement must be supported by “fair and reasonable consideration independent from the continuation of employment.” Act, lines 1287-1297, at page 58-59.

The Act also requires that a non-competition agreement “expressly state that the employee has the right to consult with counsel prior to signing.” Act, lines 1289, at page 59.

Further, the Act applies to all employees and independent contractors working in Massachusetts regardless of whether the agreement has a choice-of-law provision specifying the law of some other jurisdiction applies. Act, lines 1249-51, at page 57. (How it will apply to sales personnel with multi-jurisdiction territories remains to be seen, and its provision purporting to apply its requirements to those who are a “resident of” Massachusetts as opposed to those working there certainly appears one likely to be litigated as well. Act, lines 1346-1349, at page 61.)

The Death of Reasonable Pro-Employer Restrictions In Massachusetts?

The Act certainly requires employers to pay attention. But it preserves many tools for employers to use with employees, so it seems that reports of the death of such restrictions is greatly exaggerated. When employers understand a core of four concepts about the new law, they will be able to structure their approach accordingly.

First and foremost, the Act requires that most non-compete periods be limited to one-year during which the employee receives garden-leave pay or some “other mutually agreed-upon consideration.” Act, lines 1318-1330, at page 60. The Act defines garden-leave pay as payment of at least half of the employee’s highest base salary during the two years preceding the restricted period but it does not define in any way the phrase “other mutually agreed-upon consideration.” Id. The Act also allows the one-year period to be extended to two years and the obligation to pay compensation to vanish where the employee has breached fiduciary duties or has taken property belonging to the employer. Act, lines 1305-1313, at page 59-60. In the end, the Act states that such provisions “must be no broader than necessary to protect one or more . . . legitimate business interests of the employer” but also that “[a] noncompetition agreement may be presumed necessary where the legitimate business interest cannot be adequately protected through an alternative restrictive covenant, including but not limited to a non-solicitation agreement or a non-disclosure or confidentiality agreement.” Act, lines 1298-1304, at page 59.   But the Act also notes that courts may “reform or otherwise revise” such agreements to be consistent with the Act and Massachusetts public policy. Act, lines 1331, at page 60 and Act, lines 1343-1345, at page 61.

Second, the Act precludes enforcement of non-competition agreements against certain classes of employees. An employer may not enforce non-competes against employees who are (i) nonexempt under the Fair Labor Standards Act, (ii) undergraduate or graduate students who are in an internship program or other short-term employment relationship with an employer (whether paid or unpaid) while enrolled in a full-time or part-time undergraduate or graduate educational institution, (iii) under age 18, or (iv) terminated without cause, though “cause” and “without cause” are undefined. Act, lines 1332-1342, at page 61. Still, the Act expressly states that a number of traditional restrictions fall outside its requirements, and may continue to be used by Massachusetts’ employers, including the following as agreements unaffected by the Act:

  • those “not to solicit or hire employees of the employer”
  • those “not to solicit or transact business with customers, clients, or vendors of the employer”
  • those “made in connection with the sale of a business entity or substantially all of the operating assets of a business entity or partnership, or otherwise disposing of the ownership interest of a business entity or partnership, or division or subsidiary thereof, when the party restricted by the noncompetition agreement is a significant owner of, or member or partner in, the business entity who will receive significant consideration or benefit from the sale or disposal”
  • those “outside of an employment relationship”
  • “forfeiture agreements,” which are defined as “an agreement that imposes adverse financial consequences on a former employee as a result of the termination of an employment relationship, regardless of whether the employee engages in competitive activities following cessation of the employment”
  • nondisclosure or confidentiality agreements
  • invention assignment agreements.

[Act, lines 1268-1281, at page 58.]

Perhaps of greatest interest, employers may still extract longer non-competes “made in connection with the cessation of or separation from employment if the employee is expressly given seven business days to rescind,” which means that noncompetition agreement may be part of a severance agreement. Id. How that will play out where one enters into a severance agreement with one who would otherwise be terminated without cause will prove interesting.

Third, the Act also limits both geographic scope and precludable competitive activities. It does so by limiting scope to those geographic areas employee actually worked in and those services the employee actually provided—during employee’s last two years of employment. This is seen in the statutory language that says “[a] geographic reach that is limited to only the geographic areas in which the employee, during any time within the last two years of employment, provided services or had a material presence or influence is presumptively reasonable” and that “[a] restriction on activities that protects a legitimate business interest and is limited to only the specific types of services provided by the employee at any time during the last two years of employment is presumptively reasonable.” Act, lines 1310-1317, at page 60.

Fourth, the Act also seems to limit venue to certain specific courts. The Act states that “[a]ll civil actions relating to employee noncompetition agreements subject to this section shall be brought in the county where the employee resides or, if mutually agreed upon by the employer and employee, in Suffolk county; provided that, in any such action brought in Suffolk county, the superior court or the business litigation session of the superior court shall have exclusive jurisdiction.” Act, lines 1350-1354, at page 60-61. The notion of “exclusive jurisdiction” will also likely be the subject of contested claims brought in federal court under the Act.

All Things Considered, I’d Rather Be In ….

As noted at the outset, the Massachusetts Act is a set of significant, material changes for employers. But they are manageable when one understands the full panoply of options that remain open to employers in Massachusetts and takes the time to plan with counsel for the October 1st transition to a new non-compete regime that in fact will continue to include much of what is already in use for sophisticated employers. So, Massachusetts will remain manageable.

In E.J. Brooks Company v. Cambridge Security Seals, the Court of Appeals of New York narrowed the scope of permissible damage claims plaintiffs can assert in trade secret actions under New York law. The ruling denies plaintiffs the ability to recover costs that defendants avoided through misappropriating trade secrets (known as “avoided costs” theory), making New York law less attractive to certain types of trade secret actions due to the state’s conservative approach in calculating damages.

E.J. Brooks Company d/b/a TydenBrooks (“TydenBrooks”), the largest manufacturer of plastic indicative security seals in the United States, brought an action in federal district court against rival manufacturer Cambridge Security Seals (“CSS”), asserting causes of action that included common law misappropriation of trade secrets, unfair competition and unjust enrichment. TydenBrooks alleged that former TydenBrooks employees misappropriated trade secrets after defecting to CSS and sought damages based on an “avoided costs” theory.

Under an “avoided costs” calculation, the plaintiff estimates damages based on the amount the defendant saved in research and development costs by unlawfully acquiring the plaintiff’s trade secrets. At trial, the jury found CSS liable under all three claims and awarded TydenBrooks a $3.9 million judgment based solely on the TydenBrooks’ avoided cost theory.

On appeal, the Second Circuit requested guidance from the New York State Court of Appeals on the issue of whether, under New York law, a plaintiff asserting claims of misappropriation of a trade secret, unfair competition, and unjust enrichment can recover damages measured by the costs the defendant avoided due to its unlawful activity. Prior New York precedent had not conclusively addressed whether a plaintiff could recover damages based solely on the cost avoidance of a defendant’s unlawful misappropriation of trade secrets.

In a 4-3 decision, the Court of Appeals held that a plaintiff may not elect to measure its damages by the defendant’s avoided costs in lieu of the plaintiff’s own losses. The majority went on to explain that the calculation of damages must be narrowly focused on the economic injuries incurred by the plaintiff. The minority noted that the decision departs from the predominant rule accepted by most states and may even encourage unlawful theft of trade secrets in circumstances where the unlawful actor’s benefit far exceeds the likely cost of defending against a trade secret action. Other jurisdictions, such as the Fifth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, have either allowed actions based solely on an “avoided cost” theory, or allowed a calculation of reasonable royalty[1] in lieu of a calculation of the plaintiff’s own losses.

Companies should be aware of New York’s conservative approach to damage calculations when entering into litigation surrounding trade secrets. Plaintiffs should also pay special attention to choice of law and choice of forum provisions in their contractual dealings with employees and contractors, as these may have an impact on the type of calculations that can be used to assess damages.

It is also important to note that the federal government expanded protections for trade secrets in adopting the Defend Trade Secrets Act (“DTSA”) of 2016. DTSA claims were not at issue in this case, because it predated DTSA’s enactment, but are an important consideration given the current case law in New York.

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[1] A reasonable royalty is similar to “avoided costs” because it allows a plaintiff to recover damages in lieu of showing actual loss.

This post was written with significant assistance from Eduardo J. Quiroga, a 2018 Summer Associate at Epstein Becker Green.

So far, the year 2018 has brought an increasing number of labor and employment rules and regulations. To help you stay up to date, we are pleased to invite you to join our Employment, Labor & Workforce Management Webinar Series. Each month, we will focus on a specific industry, topic, or practice area.

Our July webinar will be hosted by Epstein Becker Green’s Health Employment and Labor (HEAL) strategic service team and Trade Secrets and Employee Mobility service team. This webinar will provide an overview of the legal landscape of non-compete agreements in the health care industry, including state law requirements and restrictions, public policy considerations, recent developments, and expected trends. The webinar will also address key considerations when drafting and enforcing non-competes, engaging in the due diligence process, and integrating providers following a health care transaction.

Tuesday, July 24, 2018
12:00 p.m. – 1:00 p.m. ET

Register for this complimentary webinar today!

We published an article with NYSBA Labor and Employment Law Journal, titled “Employee Threats to Critical Technologies Are Best Addressed Through a Formalized Insider Threat Risk Assessment Process and Program.” With the New York State Bar Association’s permission, we have linked it here.

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On Monday, attorneys general in eleven states, including New York, New Jersey, Massachusetts, California, and Illinois, revealed that they are investigating several prominent fast food franchisors for their potential use of no-poaching or non-compete agreements restricting the ability of low wage workers to obtain a better-paying job with another franchise. To that end, these attorneys general have propounded document and information requests to these restaurants, returnable August 6, 2018.

In the Illinois AG’s press release, Attorney General Madigan stated that “No-poach agreements trap workers in low-wage jobs and limit their ability to seek promotion into higher-paying positions within the same chain of restaurants.” Madigan claims that at least 58 percent of major franchisors have no-poach provisions in their franchise agreements. This is not the first time that the Illinois AG has taken aim at non-compete agreements. Over two years ago, Madigan’s office sued sandwich chain Jimmy John’s for employing what it deemed “highly restrictive non-compete agreements,” ultimately reaching a $100,000 settlement with the franchisor. Ten months after Illinois passed the Freedom to Work Act, which prohibits private sector employers from requiring non-compete covenants of low-wage employees, defined as the greater of the applicable federal, state, or local minimum wage (currently $7.25 under federal law and $8.25 under Illinois state law) or $13 per hour, Madigan sued a national payday lender for requiring its employees, including workers who earn less than $13 an hour, to sign a non-compete agreement as a condition of employment.

Illinois is not the only state to pursue non-compete reform. Several other states recently have enacted legislation curbing the use of non-competes with respect to certain categories of workers, such as certified nurse practitioners and midwives (New Mexico) and workers in the broadcasting industry earning under a certain salary (Utah). Other states have proposed similar legislation. For example, New Hampshire bill SB 423 would ban non-compete agreements with “low-wage employees.” On the other end of the spectrum, Vermont House Bill 556 and Pennsylvania House Bill 1938 would ban all non-competes other than those formed in connection with the sale of an ownership interest in a business entity or the dissolution of a partnership or limited liability company. Even if these bills ultimately fail, they signal a rising trend of state-level restrictive covenant reform, which will likely gain momentum as state attorneys general step up enforcement in this area.

Following what it described as a three year “one-man legal circus,” a Seventh Circuit panel recently affirmed a sanction award of over $440,000 in a trade secret misappropriation case, after finding that the defendant, Raj Shekar, “demonstrated nothing but disrespect, deceit, and flat-out hostility[.]” Teledyne Technologies Incorporated v. Raj Shekar, No. 17-2171, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 17153, at *13 (7th Cir. June 25, 2018).

Shekar worked at Teledyne Technologies as a marketing and sales manager from June 2013 until he was fired less than two years later. Following his termination, Teledyne sued him for allegedly stealing trade secrets, among other common law and statutory claims. The district court granted a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction, ordering Shekar to turn over all of his electronic devices for inspection. Shekar did not comply with any of the court’s orders, and even produced what the court found to be a “fake” hard drive that appeared “totally blank” and “fresh from the electronics store.” As a result, the district court found Shekar in civil contempt and, when Shekar failed to purge himself of contempt, the district court ultimately issued a default judgment and awarded attorneys’ fees and damages totaling more than $441,000.

The Seventh Circuit found the sanction award appropriate, and acknowledged that the large amount determined was “due solely to Shekar’s decision to drag opposing counsel (not to mention the court) through a disingenuous legal battle rather than comply with the court’s clear order.” The panel found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s calculation of attorney’s fees or in the amount of damages awarded.

In so ruling, the court sent a very strong message that attempting to abuse the judicial system in an effort to stall or prolong litigation may result in costly consequences. Parties who face obstructionist behavior during trade secret litigation may want to consider raising a motion for sanctions when appropriate.

Many physicians and other health care workers are familiar with restrictive covenants like non-competition and/or non-solicitation agreements, either as employees who have been asked to sign such covenants as a condition of their employment or as business owners seeking to enforce such covenants to protect their medical practices from competition. These covenants are usually designed to prohibit physicians or other practitioners from leaving and setting up a competing practice nearby using patient contacts, information, and/or training that they received during their employment or association with the former employer.

Restrictive covenants generally are regulated by state laws and cases, which can differ markedly from one state to the next. For physicians and some other health care professionals, there can be an additional level of complexity in the analysis of such covenants, because many states, in light of the unique position the medical profession holds in the public interest, apply special rules to covenants that restrict medical practice. Courts considering such covenants may ask whether enforcement will cause a shortage of doctors in a particular area, or within a particular specialty. A paramount consideration usually is the right of patients to obtain treatment from the physician or other health care professional of their choice.

By statute, several states that may allow non-competes generally (provided they are reasonable and protect legitimate business interests) will not enforce them at all against physicians. Massachusetts was an early adopter, in 1977, of a statutory prohibition on physician non-competes. Mass. Gen. Law Ch. 112 § 12X renders void any non-compete provision restricting “the right of a physician to practice medicine in a particular locale and/or for a defined period of time.” In the early 1980s, Delaware and Colorado enacted similar laws. 6 Del. Code Ann. § 2707; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-2-113.[1] In 2016, Rhode Island followed suit and enacted a law just like Massachusetts’ statute. R.I. Gen. Laws §5-37-33.

Some other states do not prohibit physician non-competes but apply stricter standards to such agreements than they do to employee non-competes generally. For example, enacted in 2007 and amended several times thereafter, Tennessee’s statute allows physician (including radiologist) non-compete provisions if they: (1) are in writing; (2) last no longer than two years after the physician’s employment is terminated; and (3) either (a) are geographically limited to the greater of the county where the physician is employed or a ten mile radius of the primary practice site; or (b) there is no geographic restriction, but the physician is restricted from practicing at any facility in which the employer provided services during the physician’s time of employment. Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-1-148.

Texas law allows physician non-competes provided that the covenant must: not deny the physician access to a list of the patients seen or treated within one year of termination of employment; provide access to medical records of the physician’s patients upon proper authorization; provide for a buyout of the covenant by the physician at a reasonable price; and allow the physician to provide continuing care and treatment to a specific patient or patients during the course of an acute illness. Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 15.50.

A New Mexico statute first enacted in 2015 prohibits provisions in agreements which restrict the right of healthcare practitioners (including physicians, osteopathic physicians, dentists, podiatrists and certified registered nurse anesthetists) to provide clinical healthcare services.[2]  (That limitation does not apply to agreements between shareholders, owners, partners or directors of the practice.) The law, however, does allow non-disclosure provisions relating to confidential information; non-solicitation provisions of no more than one (1) year; and imposes reasonable liquidated damages provisions if the practitioner does provide clinical healthcare services of a competitive nature after termination of the agreement.  In addition, healthcare practitioners employed by the practice for less than three (3) years may be required, upon termination, to pay back certain expenses to the practice, including loans; relocation expenses; signing bonuses or other incentives related to recruitment; and education/training expenses.  N.M. Stat. § 24-1l-1 et seq.

And a Connecticut law enacted in 2016, rather than prohibiting physician non-competes, limits the allowable duration (to one year) and geographical scope (up to 15 miles from the “primary site where such physician practices”) of any new, amended or renewed physician agreement.  The law also renders physician non-competes unenforceable if the physician’s employment or contractual relationship is terminated without cause.  Conn. Gen. Stat. §20-14p(b)(2).

Other states may have, or may be considering enacting, statutes restricting non-competes and related agreements for healthcare providers. The trend is certainly toward limitations on such agreements. Accordingly, consultation with local legal counsel regarding these issues is highly recommended for any person or entity practicing in the healthcare industry.

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[1] Under Delaware and Colorado’s non-compete statutes, physicians can be required to pay damages “reasonably related to the injury suffered” by a breach of any such agreement. The Colorado statute was amended in 2018 to clarify that physicians may disclose their continuing practice and provide new contact information to any of their patients who have a “rare disorder,” and not be subject to claims for damages.

[2] This prohibition was expanded in 2018 to include certified nurse practitioners and mid-wives, and to prohibit the use of choice of forum and choice of law agreements to prevent circumvention of the prohibition.

Featured on Employment Law This Week: NJ Senate Advances Ban on Sex Harassment Confidentiality Agreements.

The New Jersey Senate wants no more secrecy around harassment claims. On a 34-to-1 vote, the chamber approved legislation banning

involving sexual harassment claims. The bill is still pending in the House, where a vote is expected in the next few weeks. The legislation would also allow victims to keep their identities confidential and would establish jurisdiction in Superior Court, arguably bypassing arbitration agreements.

Watch the segment below.

Jim Flynn, an attorney in Epstein Becker & Green’s Newark, New Jersey office, recently addressed in separate forums the delicate balance that trade secret owners and their counsel must strike when litigating over trade secrets and confidential information. First, Mr. Flynn moderated a panel discussion among trade secret litigators (including one from Beijing) at the American Intellectual Property Law Association (“AIPLA”) Spring Meeting in Seattle, Washington. His May 16th AIPLA session was entitled “A Litigator’s Guide to Protecting Trade Secrets During Litigation,” and program materials included his written paper on the Catch-22 aspects noted above. Additionally, Mr. Flynn published on May 23, 2018 an International Lawyers Network IP Insider article entitled The Catch-22 Of Litigating Your Trade Secrets Case Without Revealing The Secrets Themselves that addressed these topics in further detail.   As he pointed out in that article:

“You mean there’s a catch?”

“Sure there’s a catch,” Doc Daneeka replied. “Catch-22. Anyone who wants to get out of combat duty isn’t really crazy.”

There was only one catch and that was Catch-22, which specified that a concern for one’s own safety in the face of dangers that were real and immediate was the process of a rational mind. Orr was crazy and could be grounded. All he had to do was ask; and as soon as he did, he would no longer be crazy and would have to fly more missions. Orr would be crazy to fly more missions and sane if he didn’t, but if he was sane, he had to fly them. If he flew them, he was crazy and didn’t have to; but if he didn’t want to, he was sane and had to. Yossarian was moved very deeply by the absolute simplicity of this clause of Catch-22 and let out a respectful whistle.

[Heller, Catch-22, at 52 (1999, S &S Classics Edition))]

Trade secret litigators (and especially trade secret trial attorneys) and their clients let out a similar whistle often—Because “trade-secret litigation” is an oxymoron in many ways. The very desire to protect one’s trade secrets, i.e. to keep them secret, requires disclosing them to a certain extent in certain ways to certain people (in other words making them less secret). Thus, the whistle is usually more regretful than respectful, as those forced to litigate to defend their trade secrets face a classic Catch-22 scenario. Rather than whistling a happy tune to overcome the fear of losing one’s trade secret protection, these litigants and litigators are whistling past the graveyard, knowing that all manner of frights, scares, and dangers—real and imagined—lurk in the pleading, discovery, motion and trial phases of such litigation. The goal here is give such litigants and litigators a few hints for making that a safer trip.

Read the full article here.

On May 10, 2018, the New Jersey Assembly Labor Committee advanced Assembly Bill A1769, a bill that seeks to provide stricter requirements for the enforcement of restrictive covenants.

If enacted, the legislation would permit employers to enter into non-competes with employees as a condition of employment or within a severance agreement, but such non-competes would only be enforceable if they meet all of the requirements set forth in the legislation. Thus, if enacted, employers will have to comply with the following requirements in order for a New Jersey non-competition agreement to be enforceable:

  1. If the non-compete is entered into in connection with commencement of employment, the employer must disclose the terms in writing to the prospective employee by the earlier of a formal offer of employment, or 30 business days before the commencement of the employee’s employment;
  2. If the non-compete is entered into after commencement of employment, the employer must provide the agreement to the employee at least 30 business days before the agreement is to be effective;
  3. The non-compete agreement must be signed by both the employer and the employee and expressly state that the employee has a right to consult with counsel;
  4. The non-compete shall not be broader than necessary to protect the legitimate business interests of the employer, including the employer’s trade secrets or other confidential information, such as sales information, business plans, and customer or pricing information;
  5. The time period of the non-compete must not exceed 1 year following the date of termination of employment;
  6. The non-compete must be reasonable in geographic scope, meaning that it must be limited to the geographic area in which the employee provided services or had a material presence during the two years preceding the date of termination, and the non-compete may not restrict the employee from seeking employment in other states;
  7. The non-compete shall be reasonable in the scope of the proscribed activities and limited to only the specific types of services provided by the employee at any time during the employee’s last two years of employment;
  8. The agreement must state that the employee will not be penalized for challenging the enforceability of the non-compete;
  9. The agreement should not contain a choice of law provision that would have the effect of avoiding the requirements of the legislation;
  10. The agreement shall not waive the employee’s substantive, procedural, or remedial rights provided under the legislation or any other law, or under the common law;
  11. The non-compete shall not restrict the employee from providing a service to a customer of the employer if the employee does not initiate or solicit the customer; and
  12. The agreement shall not be unduly burdensome on the employee, injurious to the public, or inconsistent with public policy.

The bill broadly defines “[r]estrictive covenant” as any agreement between an employer and an employee under which the employee “agrees not to engage in certain specified activities competitive with the employee’s employer after the employment relationship has ended.” It is unclear whether the bill intends to apply only to traditional non-compete agreements or whether it is also intended to apply to other forms of restrictive covenants, such as non-solicit and/or anti-raiding provisions. It appears, however, that the bill is intended to apply only to non-competes as the proposed legislation contains a provision stating that a restrictive covenant may be presumed necessary where the legitimate business interest cannot be adequately protected through an alternative agreement, such as “an agreement not to solicit or hire employees of the employer; an agreement not to solicit or transact business with customers, clients, referral sources, or vendors of the employer; or a nondisclosure or confidentiality agreement.”

Moreover, the bill provides that any non-compete shall be unenforceable against all non-exempt employees, as well as other types of short-term or low-wage employees.

An employer who seeks to enforce the non-compete would be required to notify the employee in writing within 10 days after the termination of the employment relationship of the employer’s intent to enforce the non-compete. Failure to provide such notice shall void the agreement; however, notice need not be given in the event the employee was terminated due to misconduct.

Unless the employee was terminated for misconduct, the bill would also require employers who enforce a non-compete to pay the employee during the restricted period 100 percent of the pay that the employee would have been entitled and make whatever benefit contributions would be required in order to maintain the fringe benefits to which the employee would have been entitled.

If enacted, the legislation would allow employees to bring a cause of action against any employer or person alleged to have violated the act. In addition to injunctive relief, employees would be permitted to recover liquidated damages, compensatory damages, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.

As with many other New Jersey employment laws, the bill would require employers to post a copy of the act or summary in a prominent place in the work area.

While the act would go into effect immediately upon enactment, it would not apply to any agreement in effect on or before the date of enactment.

If enacted, Assembly Bill A1769 would severely curb the use of non-competes in New Jersey. Employers should be aware of the multitude of requirements they would have to establish in order to enforce a non-compete, including the requirement to pay employees 100 percent of their salary during the time the non-compete is in effect. Thus, in the event the bill is signed into law, employers should now begin to consider implementing other types of agreements aimed at protecting their legitimate business interests, such as confidentiality agreements and non-solicit agreements in lieu of non-competition agreements.