Trade Secrets & Employee Mobility

On Spilling Secrets, our podcast series on the future of non-compete and trade secrets law, our panelists connect the enchantment of Harry Potter with the intricacies of trade secrets and restrictive covenants:

Prepare to be spellbound this Halloween as we cast a magical twist on the realm of trade secrets and restrictive covenants! Whether you're a Gryffindor at heart or more of a Slytherin, there's something for every magical mind seeking to safeguard their organization’s trade secrets.

Epstein Becker Green attorneys A. Millie Warner, Jill K. Bigler, and Aime Dempsey team up with Kristen O’Connor—Senior Assistant General Counsel, Employment at Marsh & McLennan Companies—to wave their legal wands over topics such as Professor Snape’s secret potion book, Hermione’s clever jinxes, and much more.

The United States Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits will have their chance to weigh in on the FTC’s Noncompete Ban, which had been scheduled to go into effect on September 4, 2024, but was enjoined a couple of weeks before that date.

First, the Fifth Circuit.  The FTC Noncompete Ban was blocked on a nationwide basis on August 20, 2024, when the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas issued a memorandum opinion and order in Ryan LLC v. Federal Trade Comm’n, Case No. 3:24-cv-00986-E, granting the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and setting aside the Ban.  On October 18, 2024, the FTC filed a Notice of Appeal of the opinion and order to the Fifth Circuit.  The FTC Noncompete Ban remains enjoined during the pendency of this appeal.

In addition to the Fifth Circuit appeal, the FTC is taking a second bite at the proverbial apple, in the Eleventh Circuit.  On August 15, 2024, in Properties of the Villages, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, Case No. 5:24-cv-316, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida granted the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction (although limited in scope only to the plaintiff), prohibiting the FTC from enforcing the Noncompete Ban.  This was similar to how the U.S. District Court in Texas had previously ruled, on Ryan LLC’s preliminary injunction motion.  On September 24, 2024, the FTC filed a Notice of Appeal of the Florida District Court’s preliminary injunction to the Eleventh Circuit.

National Labor Relations Board (“Board”) General Counsel Jennifer Abruzzo (“Abruzzo”) issued a General Counsel Memo (Memo GC 25-01) last week signaling that employers could face civil prosecution and significant monetary remedies for using non-compete and so-called “stay-or-pay” provisions in agreements with their employees.The new memo, issued on October 7, 2024, builds on Abruzzo’s earlier General Counsel Memo issued in May 2023, where, as we reported, she outlined her belief that nearly all post-employment non-competes violate employees’ rights under the National Labor Relations Act (the “Act”).

Since Abruzzo’s May 2023 memo, employers have witnessed a number of significant developments in this space, including the Federal Trade Commission’s (“FTC”) issuance of a rule in April 2024 banning the use of most non-competes and a subsequent decision by a Texas federal judge blocking that FTC rule. In June 2024, an NLRB Administrative Law Judge issued a ruling in a case involving an Indiana HVAC company finding that non-competes and non-solicitation clauses violate the Act, a decision currently being appealed to the Board.

In her October 7, 2024 memo, Abruzzo again urges the Board to find non-competes with all employees who are subject to the Act’s jurisdiction (nonmanagerial and nonsupervisory employees) to violate the Act except in a few limited circumstances, arguing that such provisions are frequently “self-enforcing” and deter employee mobility. She also advocates for “make whole” remedies where employers are found to have continued to maintain unlawful non-competes. Specifically, the memo argues that merely voiding such provisions is insufficient and that employees should be afforded the right to seek compensatory relief for the “ill effects” that flow from complying with “unlawful non-compete provisions.”

Last week, employers who use noncompetes got more good news with respect to the Federal Trade Commission’s proposed noncompete ban.

As readers of this blog are probably aware, back in August, the FTC’s noncompete ban was blocked when the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas issued a memorandum opinion and order in Ryan LLC v. Federal Trade Comm’n, Case No. 3:24-cv-00986-E, granting the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and setting aside nationwide the FTC’s noncompete ban that was scheduled to go into effect on September 4, 2024.

Employers who use noncompetes may have breathed a sigh of relief with the Texas Court’s ruling, but a small doubt of uncertainty lingered.  Could another court reach the opposite decision and rule that the FTC noncompete ban may go into effect?

Two other federal lawsuits (one in Pennsylvania and one in Florida) challenging the FTC noncompete ban remained pending, and each had ruled upon a motion for a preliminary injunction regarding the FTC noncompete ban.  Like the Court in Texas, in Properties of the Villages, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, Case No. 5:24-cv-316 (M.D. Fla.), the Florida Court granted the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction (although limited in scope only to the plaintiff), and seemed likely to reach a final decision on the merits in line with the Texas Court. 

On September 12, 2024, the Regional Director of the National Labor Relations Board’s (“NLRB”) Region 22 in Newark, New Jersey, issued an unfair labor practice complaint against a New Jersey building services company, alleging that employee non-hire (or “no poach”) provisions in the company’s contracts with its building clients violate the National Labor Relations Act (the “Act”).

According to the NLRB’s news release, the complaint alleges that Planned Companies D/B/A Planned Building Services, which is a janitorial, building maintenance, and concierge services provider, “has maintained provisions in its contracts with its client buildings that interfere with, and are inherently destructive of, workers’ rights under Sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act.”  It further alleges that “Planned Companies restricts its client buildings from soliciting its employees to work for them in a similar job classification for a period of six months after the agreement is terminated, or from hiring employees after they leave Planned Companies’ employment. Any entity retained by the client building to replace Planned Companies is also bound by the hiring restriction.” 

A hearing before an NLRB Administrative Law Judge has been set for November 12, 2024.

On Spilling Secrets, our podcast series on the future of non-compete and trade secrets law, our panelists delve into the implications for employers following the recent blockage of the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC’s) non-compete ban.

On August 20, 2024, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas invalidated the FTC’s non-compete ban, deeming it arbitrary and capricious and beyond the scope of the agency’s statutory authority.

In this episode of Spilling Secrets, Epstein Becker Green attorneys Peter A. Steinmeyer, Erik W. Weibust, and Paul DeCamp tell us more about the court’s decision to block the ban, what legal challenges remain, and the key considerations for employers moving forward. 

Last summer, as discussed in this blog, the Georgia Court of Appeals issued a decision in N. Amer. Senior Benefits, LLC v. Wimmer that presented potential challenges for employers seeking to enforce employee non-solicitation provisions.  That case held, pursuant to Georgia’s Restrictive Covenants Act, OCGA § 13-8-50 et seq., that a restrictive covenant extending beyond the end of an individual’s employment, and undertaking to prohibit the individual from soliciting former coworkers, is unenforceable if it lacks an explicit geographic limitation. 

In a September 4, 2024 Opinion, the Georgia Supreme Court overruled that decision.  The relevant statutory provision in both cases is OCGA § 13-8-53(a), which permits enforcement of restrictive covenants “so long as such restrictions are reasonable in time, geographic area, and scope of prohibited activities.”  The Supreme Court held that “nothing in the text of subsection (a) mandates that a restrictive covenant contain an explicit geographic term, nor does subsection (a) prohibit a covenant’s geographic area from being expressed in implied terms.”

The Supreme Court continued: “In short, the plain text of subsection (a) requires with respect to geographic restrictions on competition that any such restriction be reasonable, regardless of whether the restriction is expressly stated or implied.”  The Court also noted that its reading of OCGA § 13-8-53(a) comports with the Restrictive Covenants Act’s “more permissive and flexible approach to restrictive covenants.” 

The Connecticut Supreme Court recently held that continued employment may constitute sufficient consideration for noncompete agreements under Connecticut law, but left unclear the parameters of that holding.

In Dur-A-Flex, Inc. v. Dy, Dur-A-Flex, a commercial flooring company, hired Samet Dy as a research chemist in 2004. Years later, in 2011, Dur-A-Flex required Dy to execute a noncompete agreement as a condition of continued employment. The noncompete agreement prohibited Dy from performing any services for a competitor for twenty-four months after his employment terminated. In 2013, Dy resigned and Dur-A-Flex sought to enforce the noncompete. The trial court held that the noncompete was unenforceable because continued employment can never constitute sufficient consideration for a noncompete agreement.

On appeal, the case was transferred from the appellate division to the Connecticut Supreme Court. In a July 2, 2024 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court, which had relied on a 2014 court of appeals decision entitled Thoma v. Oxford Performance Materials, Inc., to hold that “a party giving nothing more than the status quo of continuing employment … offers no consideration [in] exchange for his promise and the promise is, therefore, unenforceable.” The Supreme Court agreed with Dur-A-Flex that Thoma was distinguishable and that a 1934 Connecticut Supreme Court decision called Roessler v. Burwell was controlling. The Court held that under Roessler, “a promise of indefinite, continued employment for an at-will employee in exchange for the employee’s promise not to compete constitutes adequate consideration to form an enforceable agreement.”

As featured in #WorkforceWednesday®: This week, we’re examining the repercussions for employers of a recent court decision that set aside the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC’s) nationwide non-compete ban:

On August 20, 2024, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas blocked the FTC’s ban on non-compete agreements nationwide. What does this mean for employers?

Epstein Becker Green attorney Peter A. Steinmeyer tells us what employers should be doing now and outlines the implications of this decision on existing and future non-compete agreements.

Ten days ahead of her self-imposed deadline, Judge Ada Brown of the Northern District of Texas issued a memorandum opinion and order granting the plaintiffs’ motions for summary judgment, setting aside the Federal Trade Commission’s forthcoming Noncompete Ban nationwide, which was set to go into effect on September 4, 2024. In other words, as we predicted, the FTC’s Noncompete Ban is dead nationwide unless and until a Circuit Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court of the United States revives it.  

Judge Brown granted plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion as to every claim under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) and the Declaratory Judgment Act (DJA), ruling that the FTC exceeded its statutory authority when it issued the Noncompete Ban and that the Noncompete Ban is arbitrary and capricious.

Judge Brown set the tone for her decision by quoting the Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 144 S.Ct. 2244, 2261 (2024), where the Court overruled the principle of Chevron deference established in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc. (1984), stating: “Congress in 1946 enacted the APA as a check upon administrators whose zeal might otherwise have carried them to excesses not contemplated in legislation creating their offices.”